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Siyaves Azeri’s “On Reality of Thinking” (2021) is yet another informative contribution to 
the philosophical deployment of Vygotskian psychology. I’m grateful to Mr. Azeri for taking 
the time to reply to my comments and for the opportunity to continue this dialogue here.  
 
I have no general qualms with Azeri’s reading of Vygotsky; his reply carefully elucidated 
many of the finer points of Vygotsky’s developmental story. However, I wish to dig a little 
deeper into one of the issues he raises, namely, the role of “joint activity” and language in 
the origin of human thinking. My hunch is that, despite Azeri’s claims to the contrary, 
Vygotsky’s conception of the role of language in development remains a “sourly dissonant” 
one (Jones 2019, 30), residing at a level of competition rather than collaboration. This poses 
a stark contrast to Tomasello, whose notion of joint intentionality provides a means of 
overcoming Vygotsky’ recourse to a foundational antagonism in development. 
 
I previously argued that Tomasello’s account of the evolutionary transition from individual 
to joint and collective intentionality can buttress Vygotsky’s account of cognitive origins 
(Drain 2020). I still think this is the case, for reasons I’ll point out below. But for now, I’d 
like to consider the following passage from Azeri: 
 
Language (speech) is the most significant psychological tool, which 
constitutes and determines consciousness with the use of regulatory [emphasis 
added] reactions. The formation of consciousness as a social relation and the 
constitution of social (joint) action that precedes constitution of 
consciousness as the individualized sociality is mediated by speech that 
facilitates the emergence of reversible stimuli/reactions as the basis of social 
(joint) action [emphasis added].... It is through speech as a specific form of 
social stimuli that myself, the “I”, is formed and becomes comparable to 
others; through speech I get to know myself just in the same way that I get to 
know another.... [T]he constitution of individual consciousness and of social 
behaviour coincides—they are two facets or forms of existence of one and 
the same essence, that is, the labour (human activity) process in the widest 
sense of the term—and thus the formation of joint action is explained. In 
other words, even what Drain, following Tomasello, calls “joint 
intentionality” is necessarily preceded by human (productive) activity or 
labour as the ultimate socializing and humanizing factor (2021, 23). 
 
Azeri brings up two issue here:  
 
(1) The regulatory aspects of language, which explains and how socialized 
labor precedes the formation of individual consciousness. 
 
(2) That Tomasello’s “joint intentionality” is phylogenetically preceded by a 
stage where labor becomes the motivating force in human development.  
 
Regarding (2), much hinges on what we consider “social (joint) action” to be. If it is an 
essentially collaborative activity, then it can’t precede joint intentionality since, as Tomasello 






though still faulty, reading would be to say that Vygotsky is simply referring to joint 
intentionality when he speaks of labor, or in Azeri’s phrasing “social (joint) action.”1 I say 
this is faulty because, aside from some casual mentions (1987, 356), Vygotsky never explicitly 
embraces a theory of intentionality.2 Thus, even if labor consists in “joint activity,” it is not 
clear that the “jointedness” of such activity resembles Tomasello’s joint intentional action, 
where conspecifics knowingly collaborate in pursuit of a common goal. If anything, 
Vygotsky’s account seems to be one less about collaboration and more about subordination.  
 
For Tomasello, human labor is necessarily collaborative in origin and emerges due to 
changes in the intentional make-up of proto-sapiens. Phylogenetically preceding collaborative 
activity is a stage where social relations are marked by competition and coercion. Indeed, 
subordination and domination are the social marks of the individual (not joint) intentional 
agent who, because of such limits in intentionality, cannot yet labor in the human sense. As 
we’ll see, Vygotsky never seems to get past this level of competitive, subordinative, 
intentionality. 
 
This point about subordination turns us back to (1), the issue of regulation. It’s true that 
Vygotsky explains the origin of human consciousness through the regulative aspect of the 
sign. In Azeri’s words, 
 
The formation of consciousness and its emancipation from immediate field 
of activity is possible through deployment of specific artificial devices, that is, 
psychological tools that are utilized by human beings in order to master their 
own behaviour just as technical devices are deployed toward mastery of 
objective processes (23).  
 
However, there is a point not covered here by Azeri: Vygotsky’s “regulative” account hinges 
on the centralization of “directive” speech acts (commands or imperatives). With directives, 
one directs the activity of another, and in turn begins to “self-direct” (or self-regulate). It’s my 
claim that Vygotsky’s reliance on directives de facto keeps his account stuck at the level of 
individual intentionality.3 Directive speech acts feature prominently in Tomasello’s 
 
1 It’s not clear (as I hope to show) that labor is a joint activity by Vygotsky’s account. Such is not the case for 
A.N. Leontiev, who is close to Tomasello in claiming outright that labor processes are developmentally 
contingent upon “conditions of joint, collective activity” (Leontiev 2009, 185; see also Drain 2018). 
2 Vygotsky falls short of ever affirming intentionality as a basic property of mind. In “The Problem of 
Consciousness” (1997a, 129-130), there is mention that “the relation between function and phenomena (the 
problem of intentionality)” is one of the questions that arises when considering “consciousness as a system of 
functions” (Carl Stumpf, mentor to Edmond Husserl, is mentioned in parentheses here). But none of these are 
Vygotsky’s actual words. The document serves as notes for a series of Vygotsky’s private talks with his research 
group, with insertions added by A. Zaporoshets. So, while intentionality is recognized as a problem by 
Vygotsky and his interlocuters, it is never explicitly thematized nor is there any attempt to explicate its social 
nature. This is especially evident when, borrowing from Kurt Lewin, Vygotsky treats the introduction of 
symbolic operations into the “field” of activity as something specifically human and integral in the formation of 
“any intentions” whatsoever, i.e., “in creating free action independent of the direct situation” (Vygotsky 1999, 
36). While intentions may be a species of intentionality (Searle 1983), Vygotsky is focused neither on the fact of 
intentionality itself, nor on its social nature, but rather on the emergence of a “planning function” (Jones 2017) 
that frees the agent from situational determination.  
3 Jones (2009, 2019, 2020) has thoroughly explicated the problems that the “command theory” of development 
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developmental story as well. But Tomasello has the benefit of accounting for a functional 
differentiation in directive communication—i.e., in collaborative activity, the command gives 
way to both the request and informational assertion. Lacking such differentiation, Vygotsky’s 
account runs the risk of playing to a rather strident conception of the socius, one more 
Machiavellian than Marxist.4  
 
Mind, Regulation, and Labor 
 
Vygotsky returns to the point of “regulation” often as he develops his cultural-historical 
approach. For instance, in his unfinished manuscript “Concrete Human Psychology,” he 
affirms Pierre Janet’s idea that “The relation of psychological functions is genetically linked 
to real relations between people: regulation of the word, verbalized behavior = power-
submission” (Vygotsky 1989). So too in The History of the Development of Higher Mental 
Functions—there Vygotsky highlights Janet as the progenitor of the “sociogenetic law of 
development.” In Vygotsky’s gloss, “the essence of this law is that in the process of 
development, the child begins to apply the same forms of behavior to himself that others 
initially applied to him” (1997b, 102). Such development, of course, relies on the sign: 
“initially the sign is always a means of social connection, a means of affecting others, and 
only later does it become a means of affecting oneself” (103). Again, Vygotsky explains that 
 
According to Janet, the word is always a command because it is a basic means of 
controlling behavior. For this reason, if we want to explain genetically from what the 
volitional function of the word is derived, why the word subordinates motor 
reaction, what the origin of the power of the word over behavior is in both 
ontogenesis and phylogenesis, we unavoidably arrive at the real function of the 
command... [T]he relation of mental functions must be genetically attributed to real 
relations between people. Regulating another’s behavior by means of the word leads 
gradually to the development of verbalized behavior of the individual himself (104).    
 
Vygotsky, then, takes it as “self-evident” that “the word was initially a command for others” 
before becoming “a complex story consisting of imitation, changes in function, etc., and was 
only gradually separated from action” (103).  
 
Vygotsky’s (Janet-inflected) idea that the origin of language is found in the social imperative 
is traceable at least in part to Ludwig Noiré, who argued that humans are not only the “tool-
making animal” and “the gregarious animal”, but also the “cooperative animal” (Noiré 1917, 
138). By this account, the earliest words are verbal, rather than nominative, and thus the 
 
though see Jones (2009, 173) for a quick summary. Instead, I simply want to defend the proposition that 
Vygotsky does not utilize a theory of joint intentionality but that he should. 
4 One could just as easily replace “Machiavellian” with “Hobbesian,” though the former may also refer to the 
“Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis” of Humphry (1976)—which Tomasello is decidedly against (Moll & 
Tomasello 2007). A future paper will have to deal with whether Tomasello is correct in framing his own project 






“earliest meaning ... referred to human action” in a cooperative context (139).5 Vygotsky’s 
suggestion that social subordination is the primary function of speech unnecessarily distorts 
this cooperative model into something resembling the master/slave dialectic (Jones 2019, 29-
30).  
 
For Vygotsky, the apprehension and utilization of the sign marks a transformational leap 
between unmediated affective communication as exhibited in apes and the mediated 
linguistic communication of early humans. Such a phylogenetic transition is illustrated in the 
movement from a stage of (a) “receptive” 6 self-monitoring (affectively based on situationally 
bound stimuli) to a stage of (b) cognitive, conceptual, self-monitoring (where the individual 
can take on the perspective of another in relation to her own cognitive states). As such, the 
historical division of labor is mirrored in development insofar as the “separation of 
functions among people is the basic mechanism of modification and transformation of 
function of the individual himself” (Vygotsky 1997b, 104). Inter-personal verbal regulation 
thus spurs the development of intra-personal verbal regulation; the social is moved “inside” 
the individual subject, and she can regulate her own behavior internally in the same manner 
as the supervisor externally regulated the subordinate. As Vygotsky makes clear, the role of 
the “director” of activity and “fulfiller” of activity are united in the mature cognitive subject: 
“An important step in the evolution of work is the following: what the supervisor does and 
what the underling does is united in one person. This... is the basic mechanism of voluntary 
attention and work” (1997b, 104).  
 
According to Azeri, “owing to the sociality of psychological and conceptual tools the 
internalization of which amounts to the formation of individual consciousness, ‘pure’ 
thinking also emerges as truly social... pure thinking is ‘joint’ thinking (2021, 25). My 
concern, however, is whether Vygotsky’s embrace of Janet’s “command account,” insofar as 
it is predicated on an antagonistic picture of originary social relations, undermines a more 
cohesive thesis regarding cooperativity as the precondition for cognitive development. It just 
may be that Vygotsky does not have enough conceptual tools, or the right ones, to “move 
beyond” individual intentionality. Tomasello’s utilization of speech act theory, along with his 
focus on intentionality, offers a well-served corrective in this regard.  
 
Joint Intentionality and Communication  
 
According to Tomasello, joint intentionality augmented the communicative potential of early 
humans. At a previous stage of development, pre-sapiens “individual intentional” agents 
communicatively engaged only in directive speech acts—using ritualized signals responding 
to desires and beliefs, though with situational (imagistic and schematic) rather than 
propositional contents. Such communication relies on the understanding of certain 
perceptions and goal states, and utilizes a practical reasoning apparatus. But all this is done 
on the basis of an individually competitive rather than a cooperatively intentional foundation 
 
5 Brandist (2007) claims that Vygotsky read Noiré, though I find no references in the Plenum Edition of 
Vygotsky’s collected works. Leontiev, on the other hand, certainly engaged with Noiré, as Keiler (2008 & 2010) 
effectively demonstrates.  
6 In distinguishing ape from human consciousness, Vygotsky uses James’ (1892) distinctions between the 
human facility with concepts, which are abstract (and socially mediated Vygotsky would add), and the non-
human facility with “recepts” (Romanes 1888) or “constructs” (Morgan 1891), which are composite 
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(Tomasello 2008, 105). In other words, our proto-human forebears engaged in social and 
technical causal reasoning, but only communicated with respect to conspecific behavioral 
regulation. This changes with the introduction of joint intentionality, which itself inaugurates a 
communicative shift towards cooperation. As such, joint intentionality allows for a 
differentiation in the directive speech act: insofar as these early hominins engaged in 
collaborative activity, they engendered a new communicative motive, that of sharing relevant 
information with respect to the other’s role in the activity. Thus, Tomasello hypothesizes 
that at some point in the evolution of joint intentional cognition, purely directive 
communication was expanded to allow for both informative and requestive communicative 
acts.  
 
The advent of an informational motive alongside the directive motive had three major 
consequences for the evolution of human thinking: 
 
(1) It brought about truth conditions—if a collaborator wants to be seen as a 
cooperative partner (ever important in the Homo heidelbergensis foraging 
ecology), she must commit herself to relaying information honestly. This 
occurred first and foremost during the collaborative act itself, but gradually 
spread to the social interface of the band apart from such immediate activity.  
 
(2) It created what Tomasello calls a new “relevance inference,” where the 
recipient of a communicative act may infer that a certain act is intended for 
her with a purpose relevant to her specific goals (Tomasello 2014, 52). Great 
apes and those varieties of hominins prior to Homo heidelbergensis can make no 
such inferences. 
 
(3) Most important for us here, Tomasello notes that one major result of 
collaborative communication is the emergence of the distinction between 
communicative force and content. With the purely directive gesture, there is little 
room between the force of ostensive act itself (pointing to an object I want 
you to hand me, e.g.) and its content (the object itself). Thus, to the 
individually-intentional mind, the status of the directive is ambiguous with 
respect to a whether it is a command or request. Because of joint 
intentionality, certain ostensive gestures can now be differentiated. With the 
help of intonational specification, the same ostensive gesture (pointing to a 
stick) can be registered as either a directive (as either a request or command 
for the stick) or an assertive, where information about the location or 
existence of a thing is simply being communicated for the benefit of the 
collaborative partner.  
 
For Tomasello, these three effects entail that “the situational (propositional) content of the 
communicative act was starting to be conceptualized as independent of the particular 
intentional states of the communicator” (loc. cit.). The content tied to the situation and goals 








Directives and Cooperation  
 
On their own, commands (and requests and entreaties, etc.) are “directive” speech acts in 
that they “are attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something (Searle 1979, 13). 
For Vygotsky to place directives as the first words does satisfy the basic conditions of an 
“activity-model” of language origins, which stipulates that language fundamentally functions 
to coordinate social activity and that word meaning is grounded on socially coordinated 
activity rather than some mechanism of reference (Winograd and Flores 1986, 17; see also 
Hutchins and Johnson 2009). Such an “activity model” certainly seems sympathetic with the 
general Marxian thesis that labor begets language (Engels 1946). However, the “directive” 
focus of Vygotsky’s account omits dealing with any cooperative social relations in the sense 
that cooperation requires more than just the mutual affirmation of individual intentions. 
Directive utterances may or may not be part of a joint intentional enterprise, e.g., compare 
“Move that” with “Pass that to me (since we are building this together).” The first expresses 
a desire, and the respondent can choose to respond accordingly (obey or suffer the 
consequences). In a technical sense, this is part of a “social” interaction—but not a joint one. 
Such social activity, by the Vygotskian account, is thus reducible to the aggregate sum of 
individual intentions; there is not a “Wir” involved, merely a dyad of “Ichs.” By contrast, the 
latter expression indicates something more than just an aggregate of individual intentions 
(Searle 1995; Swindler 1996). In the request, then, is the beginning of a qualitatively novel 
“we” intentionality (and the same can be said for informational assertions in a collaborative 
context).     
 
Any sociogenetic explanation of the origin of mind and language should explicitly deal with 
joint and collective intentionality rather than leave it ambiguous whether individual 
intentional states are all that are in play in communication. Vygotsky’s Engels-inspired 
account certainly seems as though it should qualify here. Unfortunately, without a coherent 
theory of intentionality, there is little to differentiate the social activity and mentality of apes 
from that of humans. As I pointed out in Drain (2020), the individually intentional hominid 
can still entertain abstract representations about the social world—only theirs is a world 
determined by competition rather than cooperation. In other words, “social (joint) action” is 
not sufficient for human cognitive genesis since non-humans do it too. 
 
The problems of Vygotsky’s “directive origin” of communication—i.e., that it assumes an 
antagonistic social relationality, that the intentional status of creatures engaging in “joint” 
activity still might be one of an aggregate of competing individual intentions—can be 
dissolved if we follow Tomasello in taking human communication as essentially cooperative 
in its origin, regardless of whether it is later used to achieve particularly selfish ends:  
 
In the beginning skills of cooperative communication were used only in activities 
that were collaborative all the way down (and so structured by joint goals and 
attention, which provided the necessary common conceptual ground). Only later was 
cooperative communication co-opted for use outside of collaborative activities and 
for noncooperative purposes ... (2008, 170). 
 
Communicative forms that preceded human language may have been marked by dominance 






10 (3): 6-14. 2021. 
https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5Ij 
By Tomasello’s score, noncollaborative communication can return, but only as parasitic on 
primarily collaborative forms.   
 
Final Remarks  
 
For Tomasello, the communication of great apes and proto-sapiens hominins is restricted to 
directive speech acts. By the time of Homo heidelbergensis, joint intentional collaboration 
expanded the directive to include both requestive and informational components. We have 
no such nuance in Vygotsky. By his account, the command admits of no further functional 
differentiation and there is no countenancing that a collaborative component can be derived 
from it. Tomasello is clear, on the contrary, that early humans were quite adept at 
circumstantially differentiating their communicative acts. Cognitive development, then, is 
primordially driven not by the internalization of any labor antagonism but by the necessity of 
collaborative activity and the resultant perspectival simulations that undergird the 
communicative repertoire of such intentional agents.  
 
From all this we could suppose that Vygotsky is simply mistaken—but with the caveat that 
Vygotsky would have been right, if only he assigned the purely directive stage of 
communication not to early humans but to great apes and non-human hominins. To be 
generous, we may conclude that Vygotsky is in the right ballpark regarding many of his 
speculations. Much of what Vygotsky took as fact about early human communication does 
accurately correspond to Tomasello’s individual intentional agents, i.e., those apes and proto-
heidelbergensis hominins that rely on purely directive forms of communication. Some aspects 
of Vygotsky’s “directive” account, then, could apply to any number of hominins prior to 
Homo heidelbergensis. Thus, while it may be too much to hold the cause of human-specific 
thought to be the internalization of the dominant/subordinative dialectic, Vygotsky’s 
insistence that the earliest communication consisted in directives is confirmed in Tomasello’s 
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